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Evolution of the Canadian Tax Reform
John G. Head*
Introduction
The passage of the Tax Reform Bill in December 1971 marked
the end of an extraordinary decade of inquiry and debate on
federal tax reform in Canada. Minor (and some major) changes
are still being made, and a further instalment of reform is to be
expected in the area of sales taxation. The more controversial
issues of tax reform in the field of income taxation have,
however, been finally settled, at least for the next few years and
probably for a much longer period. While business firms,
families and the government wrestle with the complexities of
the new system, it is therefore time to sit back and review this
remarkable episode in Canadian public finance history.
Three main stages can be distinguished in the evolution of
the reform to 1971. The first began with the appointment of
the Carter Royal Commission in 1962 and ended with the
presentation of the Carter Report in February, 1967.' The
second began when the Minister of Finance invited public
submissions and discussion on the Carter Report and ended
after a lively public debate and prolonged government study
with the publication of the Benson White Paper in November,
1969.2 The third and final stage was the "White Paper process"
of public and parliamentary discussion of the Benson White
Paper ending with the introduction of the detailed legislation in
June 1971 and its eventual passage in December 1971.' In the
following sections we shall consider the development at each of
these three stages in turn.
*John G. Head, Professor of Economics, Dalhousie University
1 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Vol., Ottawa, 1966.
(Hereafter cited as Report.)
2 Proposals for Tax Reform, Ottawa, 1969. (Hereafter cited as White
Paper.)
3 For a useful tabular summary of the proposals made in the later
stages of the debate from the White Paper to Bill C-259, see Summary of
1971 Tax Reform Legislation, Ottawa, 1971.
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Stage I - The Carter Royal Commission
The Royal Commission was appointed by the Diefenbaker
government in September 1962, in response to a number of
specific problems and also some general misgivings about the
federal tax system. Notable amongst the former were the
treatment of the undistributed corporate surplus of closely-held
corporations and the problem of associated corporations. The
tax-free treatment of capital gains was the subject both of
general misgivings and of specific problems as the courts
struggled to draw a clear distinction between taxable income
and capital gain with increasingly arbitrary and unsatisfactory
resutls. It was also recognised that the various difficulties were
interrelated. A fundamental change in the existing tax structure
might therefore be required for a satisfactory solution. In the
absence of any great enthusiasm for any particular programme
of reform on the part of the government, the device of a
far-reaching inquiry into the existing system was adopted.
The device of a Royal Commission on taxation was new to
Canada. The U.K. Royal Commission of the early 1950's had
produced a thorough and interesting study of the British
income tax system but recommended few fundamental changes
and had little impact on existing legislation. 4 This and other
precedents were not therefore especially encouraging. Even in
principle the problem of political implementation is especially
great, as the government is entirely free to ignore politically
unpopular recommendations; and, in the case of a prolonged
and far-reaching investigation of the sort proposed, there is also
no guarantee that the government setting up the inquiry will
still be in power to receive the resulting report.
The Carter Commission laboured for four years and spent
some $4 million to produce a truly monumental six volume
report with 27 supporting staff studies. The report is recognised
throughout the world as a landmark in the annals of taxation,
and set the stage for a debate on tax reform in Canada of
unprecedented intensity and duration.
4 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, especially
Second Report, 1954 and Final Report, 1955.
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The Carter Blueprint
In contrast to the U.K. Royal Commission, the Carter
Commission chose to approach the problems of the existing tax
system not individually and "on their merits", but in terms of a
unifying vision of an ideal tax system, derived from the modern
public finance literature and in particular from Henry Simons'
classic theory of tax reform.' In accordance with this approach
the Commission places major emphasis on the equity objective:
"The first and most essential purpose of taxation is to share the
burden of the state fairly among all individuals and families".
6
For this purpose taxation should be based on ability to pay,
which requires the application of progressive rates of tax to a
comprehensive income tax base.
Following Simons, the Commission argues that the ideal
tax base is provided by the concept of "net additions to
economic power" defined as ". . .the sum of the market value
of goods and services consumed or given away in the taxation
year by the tax unit, plus the annual change in the market value
of the assets held by the unit". 7 All net gains should therefore
be included in the tax base of the unit (family or single
individual) regardless of source, form or use: "If economic
power is increased it does not matter in principle whether it was
earned or unearned, from domestic or foreign sources, in money
or in kind, anticipated or unanticipated, intended or inadvert-
ent, recurrent or non-recurrent, realized or unrealized". 8 Some
of the more striking implications of this approach would
include full taxation of bequests and gifts, accrued as well as
realized capital gains and the imputed rent of owner-occupied
dwellings on the same basis as wages, salaries, interest and
dividends. Moreover the taxation of corporations, trusts and
other intermediaries would be abandoned along with a variety
of other taxes such as sales, property and excise taxes.
The Commission similarly proceeds to derive an ap-
propriate structure of progressive tax rates to apply to the
comprehensive tax base. For this purpose they employ a
5 H. C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, Chicago, 1938.
6 Report, Vol. 1, p. 4.
7 Report, Vol. 3, p. 39.
8 Report, Vol. 3, p. 25.
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subjective and very unsatisfactory concept of "non-discretion-
ary expenses" defined as those required "to maintain the
members of the unit".9 These expenses are assumed to be a
function of income and of family responsibilities, and a wholly
arbitrary set of assumptions is made regarding these functional
relationships to yield separate progressive rate schedules for a
family and for a single taxpayer and a system of tax credits for
dependants.' 0 To complete the ideal vision, liberal averaging
provisions are required to avoid the discriminatory impact of
progressive tax rates on tax units with lumpy or fluctuating
incomes, a particularly important problem with the inclusion of
items such as bequests, gifts and capital gains in the ideal tax
base.
Like Simons, the Commission recognises that some
modifications of the ideal may be necessary to take account of
administrative and political problems and other policy objec-
tives. Thus, for example, it is argued that, because of valuation
and liquidity problems, capital gains should, at least initially, be
taxed on a realization rather than an accrual basis. To limit the
possibility of wholesale tax avoidance by the transfer of assets
at death or by gift, Simons' constructive realization proposal is
advocated under which such transers are deemed to be
realizations for tax purposes. Tax postponement is, however,
still possible under the Simons scheme, notably through the
retention of income in intermediaries such as corporations. The
possibility of accrual taxation of share gains in the case of
public corporations is recognised but not recommended.
In contrast to Simons, the continued taxation of organisa-
tions is therefore proposed. Such taxes should, however, be
regarded as withholding taxes collected on behalf of resident
families and individuals. In particular the corporate income tax
should be retained as a withholding tax on dividends and on
those capital gains which result from retained earnings. For this
purpose the corporate income tax must be fully integrated with
the personal income tax by giving the shareholder full credit for
the corporate tax against his personal income tax liability. 1
9 Report, Vol. 3, p. 5.
10. For details, see Report Vol. 3, Ch. 7.
11 For details, see Report, Vol. 4, Ch. 19.
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Certain other modifications are proposed on administrative
grounds, including the exemption of imputed rent of owner-
occupied dwellings, the services of housewives and consumption
of own products (such as furniture built by a carpenter for his
own use). Except perhaps for the case of imputed rent, most of
the adjustments proposed have a clear justification. Administra-
tive difficulties are not used simply as a convenient excuse for
arbitrary and politically expedient departures from the ideal.
Indeed the Commission rightly emphasizes the very con-
siderable administrative advantages of the comprehensive tax
base. Thus, for example, under the prevailing system the
intention or purpose of the taxpayer was an important criterion
in determining the taxability of gains from the purchase or sale
of property. Such a test can only be applied in a very arbitrary
and/or unpredictable way. By contrast, under the compre-
hensive tax base, all property gains are to be included regardless
of the original intentions or expectations of the taxpayer.
Some further modifications are, however, proposed on
account of certain political constraints. In particular the
Commission's terms of reference did not include the area of
federal-provincial-municipal relations. The abolition of sales and
property taxes could not therefore be recommended as these
taxes constitute the main independent revenue sources of the
provinces and municipalities respectively. A far-reaching reform
of the federal sales tax is, however, proposed under which the
present manufacturers sales tax would be replaced by a retail
sales tax collected if possible by the provinces which would levy
tax on the same base. It is also recognized that in the long run
these other non-income taxes should, like the corporate tax, be
integrated as far as possible with the personal income tax by
means of a system of credits.
The modifications discussed so far take no explicit account
of other public policy objectives, such as an efficient allocation
of resources, economic stability and economic growth. These
other objectives are not, however, neglected. The general
position taken by the Commission is that the (then) existing tax
system is grossly inefficient in the broad sense that a substantial
increase in equity can be achieved without sacrificing other
objectives. 12
12 Report, Vol. 6, pp. 164-5.
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Thus, for example, it is a major thesis of the Report that
the adoption of the comprehensive tax base would serve to
eliminate the distortions in private sector resource allocation
produced by a variety of discriminatory provisions or "non-
neutralities" in the existing tax system. Some of these
provisions might, however, be justified as an offset to existing
market imperfections. For instance, the "small business
incentive" provided by the low 21% rate on the first $35,000 of
taxable corporate profits might serve to offset the capital
market bias against the small corporation. Similarly the
percentage depletion allowances for the mining and petroleum
industries and the three-year exemption for new mines may in
part be justified by the special risks involved. The same might
even be said of the exemption for capital gains. The
Commission argues very persuasively, however, that the existing
provisions are vastly excessive in relation to any market
imperfections which they may be intended to offset and/or very
inefficient per dollar of revenue cost.' 3 Moreover other
important non-neutralities such as the double taxation of
dividends have no justification whatever as incentive provisions.
Certain specific and limited departures from the strict neutrality
of the comprehensive tax base are therefore recommended to
compensate for existing market imperfections. Examples in-
clude immediate write-off of capital costs for small new
businesses, immediate write-off for the exploration expenses of
mining and petroleum companies and immediate write-off for
research and development expenditures. The overall role of such
provisions in the system would, however, be dramatically
reduced, with favourable implications for resource allocation.
The Commission shows somewhat less concern for
neutrality in relation to international income flows. The major
proposal for an arbitrary 30% gross-up and credit system for
foreign taxes paid by resident individuals and corporations
would nevertheless constitute a significant improvement in both
equity and neutrality.
The possible effects of the new system on the rate. of
economic growth are likewise considered carefully and in great
13 For a brief summary of the Commission's views, see Report, Vol. 6,
pp. 88-90.
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detail.' 4 However, only very limited changes in the equity ideal
are proposed on account of growth effects, notably an arbitrary
ceiling of 50% to the structure of progressive rates applied to
the comprehensive tax base. This limit is accepted primarily in
order to minimize disincentive effects on effort, saving and
investment, and, in combination with a corporate tax rate of
50%, to remove any discrimination against dividends and in
favour of retained earnings. Even with this modification it
might reasonably be feared that full taxation of capital gains
and the increased weight of tax on certain industries, such as
mining and petroleum, could have markedly unfavourable
implications for economic growth. The Commission's detailed
analysis suggests, however, that although there would be
significant changes in the allocation of capital between different
industries, there should be little change in the overall volume of
saving and capital formation. Indeed they would expect a
modest increase in the rate of growth as a result of the
improved allocation of capital and the more effective applica-
tion of fiscal and other stabilization policies. Even allowing for
the many uncertainties in the Commission's detailed calcula-
tions, it seem clear that any adverse effects would be small and
could easily be offset by other measures. The possibility of
pursuing a more positively growth-oriented tax policy is
considered but rejected in accordance with the Commission's
primary emphasis on the equity objectives.
Other effects of the reforms are also expected to be
favourable. Canadian ownership of Canadian industry would,
for example, be strongly encouraged by restricting the benefits
of integration to resident shareholders. Similarly the Com-
mission finds no evidence that economic stability or the balance
of payments position would be unfavourably affected by the
proposed reforms either in the short run or in the long run.
Although the effects on other economic policy objectives
are therefore expected to be favourable or at least neutral,
equity remains the overriding objective of the proposed reform
programme. Even after taking account of administrative and
political restrictions and other policy objectives, the proposed
system remains remarkably close to the Simons equity ideal and
14 Report, Vol. 6, Ch. 37.
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would offer a dramatic improvement in tax equity. The
substantial broadening of the income tax base to include capital
gains, bequests and gifts and many other untaxed or under-
taxed items would eliminate a multitude of "horizontal"
inequities between people in similar economic circumstances.
Moreover, since items such as capital gains and bequests and
gifts are heavily concentrated in the higher income brackets, the
effective progressiveness of the system would be much greater,
in spite of the reduction in marginal rates to a maximum of
50%, with a consequent improvement in "vertical" equity.
Studies by the Commission had shown that, as a result of gaps
in the tax base, the existing system of direct taxation was little
better than proportional in higher income ranges.'" Further,
though somewhat less spectacular, improvements would also
result from the adoption of the family as the tax unit.
Stage II - The Carter Debate
The Carter Report was presented to parliament in February,
1967 and in April the Minister of Finance announced a tax
reform schedule. Submissions were invited from the public by
the end of September on the major income tax recommenda-
tions in the Report, and it was hoped that the government
would be in a position to reveal its own proposals in the form of
a White Paper by the end of the year. It was envisaged that the
White Paper would be studied by a parliamentary committee
and that a draft bill would then be produced incorporating any
changes which might be made as a result of the views received in
parliament, from the public and from the provincial govern-
ments. It was hoped that the relevant legislation could be passed
in 1968.
The reaction to the Report as reflected in about one
thousand submissions received during 1967 and in public
discussion was extremely hostile. The proposals for full income
taxation of capital gains and bequests and gifts, complete in-
tegration of the corporate and personal income tax and the
removal of the special concessions for the mining and petroleum
industry were particularly strongly criticized, and the whole
Report was branded as a recipe for stagnation. These criticisms
15 Report, Vol. 6, Table 36-5, p. 58.
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were for the most part articulated by representatives of the
more affluent and better organized sections of the community
and particularly by business interests. This opposition is not
difficult to explain since these were precisely the groups who
stood to lose as a result of the strong equity thrust of the Carter
reforms. It is also hardly surprising that criticism was focussed
largely on those features of the Carter package which involved
tax increases, whilst those which involved tax reductions were
generally welcomed.
Somewhat more difficult to understand perhaps was the
opposition aroused by the proposal to integrate the personal
and corporate income tax, which, in itself, would substantially
reduce the weight of tax on corporate source income by
completely eliminating the double taxation of dividends. This is
no doubt to be explained in large part by the "package"
character of the Carter proposals, under which the integration
credit was firmly tied to the proposal for full taxation of capital
gains. The possible blunting of provincial tax incentives also
made the integration proposal very unpopular with the
provinces as well as with the business community.
Against the very vocal and articulate opposition of the
business community to most of the major proposals, there was a
conspicuous absence of enthusiastic popular support from the
vast majority who stood to gain. Compared with the obvious
burdens on the more affluent sections of the population the
benefits at the lower income levels were widely dispersed and
significant in percentage terms only for the unorganised mass of
taxpayers with comprehensive income of less than $5,000.16
It would, however, be very misleading to imply that no
valid criticisms of the Carter proposals emerged in the course of
the debate, or even that the general approach adopted is above
criticism. Indeed to a large extent the unfavourable response to
the Report reflects fundamental weaknesses of the modern
theory of tax reform and the ability-to-pay tradition on which
it is based. In this general approach, as we have seen, equity is
the overriding objective; but of all the objectives that might
have been chosen this is intrinsically the most controversial.
People's conceptions of equity vary widely, and there is no
16 See, for example, Report, Vol. 6, p. 56.
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guarantee that the particular formulation of the equity objec-
tive to be found in the modern tax reform literature will necess-
arily command widespread acceptance.
Like Simons, the Commission recognises that both the
horizontal and vertical equity aspects of this approach require
ethical judgements: "These are questions of belief rather than
of fact. We can do no more than recommend what we believe to
be fair."' ' Problems of general acceptability and political
implementation are not completely ignored, but are essentially
glossed over with the hopeful assertion that there is a
''consensus among Canadians" on these extremely controversial
distributional questions.' 8 Thus, like Simons, the Commission
probably greatly overrates the equity appeal of the compre-
hensive tax base. Many people simply do not agree that capital
gains, bequests and gifts should be taxed as income in the same
way as wages and salaries. Similarly the particular structure of
progressive tax rates chosen may or may not fall within
Canadian conceptions of what is "fair and reasonable".' 9
Related, but in some respects conceptually quite distinct,
is the obvious but fundamental problem that those who stand
to lose as a result of particular proposals must in general be
expected to oppose them. This is true even where agreement
might in principle be obtained that the proposal is "fair".
Redistribution of income is the essence of the proposed reform,
and those who stand to lose cannot generally be expected to
abstract in altruistic fashion from their vested interest in the
status quo. This accounts to some extent for the fact that the
equity aspects of the various proposals were seldom attacked
directly but rather by emphasizing their unfavourable implica-
tions for economic growth.
Somewhat different problems arise in the treatment of
other policy objectives. Thus, for example, in the case of the
neutrality objective it is always possible to argue that the
existence of market distortions or special social benefits justifies
continuing preferential treatment. These alleged social benefits
or market distortions are often very difficult to quantify
precisely, and as a result the economic case for eliminating or
17 Report, Vol. 1, p. 5 (italics added).
18 See, for example, Report, Vol. 2, p. 10 and Vol. 3, p. 5.
19 Report, Vol. 3, p. 8.
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even substantially reducing preferential treatment is seldom
completely conclusive even though it may be very strong.
The Commission's general strategy in relation to other
objectives had been to try to minimize conflict by ensuring that
the programme as a whole would involve no sacrifice of other
goals, and notably of economic growth. Conflict cannot,
however, be completely avoided in this way since there may be
no agreement that the primary emphasis should be placed on
the equity objective.
In view of the overwhelmingly unfavourable "public"
response to the Report and the critical attitude of most of the
provinces and also of the Conservative opposition, it is hardly
surprising that the government preferred to delay taking a firm
position on such a controversial issue with the likely prospect of
an election in 1968. The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Benson,
announced the change in the government's tax reform schedule
in April 1968, indicating that, if the government was reelected,
some changes could be expected in the fall budget, but that the
major reforms would be presented some time in 1969, probably
in the form of a Bill rather than the promised White Paper.
Important changes in the taxation of bequests and gifts
and also of the life insurance industry were duly announced in
the budget of October 1968. These changes can, however, be
properly appreciated only in the general context of the
government's major income tax proposals which were finally
revealed in the Benson White Paper "Proposals for Tax Reform"
in November, 1969.
The White Paper Proposals
Although the government's priorities are not explicitly stated,
the far-reaching programme of reforms proposed in the White
Paper is based primarily on considerations of equity and
efficiency.
The main equity thrust of the reforms and the significant
divergences from the Carter blueprint are simultaneously
evident from the major proposals. Thus, for example, it is
proposed to tax capital gains under the personal income tax. It
is, however, precisely in this context that the Carter concept of
the comprehensive tax base is explicitly rejected: "The
government rejects the proposition that every increase in
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economic power, no matter what its source, should be treated
the same for tax purposes."'2'  The major breach in equal
treatment concerns gains on the shares of widely-held Canadian
corporations, only half of which would be included in taxable
income. In partial justification it is argued that half inclusion
"... would put Canadians in approximately the same tax
position regarding capital gains and losses on these shares as
most of the non-residents who invest in Canada."' '  By
contrast, most other capital gains, including the gains on
closely-held shares, would be taxed at full personal rates on
realization.
This is not, however, quite such a striking departure from
equal treatment as it might at first appear, as it is largely offset
by a number of other proposals, notably in the corporate tax
field. Thus, in contrast to the Commission, the government
attempts to draw a very sharp distinction between the small
closely-held corporation and the large widely-held corporation.
For the profits of closely-held corporations full integration with
the personal income tax is proposed under which shareholders
would in effect receive full credit at the personal level for
corporate income tax paid, as suggested by the Carter
Commission. The intention here is to put small corporations in
much the same tax position as the unincorporated firms which
they closely resemble and with which they "usually com-
pete. " Combined with the full taxation of closely-held share
gains, this proposal would also solve the special problems posed
by the undistributed surplus of these corporations without the
need for the existing arbitrary anti-avoidance provisions.
By contrast, in the case of widely-held corporations a
separate corporate tax is held to be justified by the effective
separation of ownership from control and by the fact that such
corporations compete with foreign public corporations subject
to similar taxes. It is also suggested that part of the tax is
probably passed on to consumers in higher prices. In contrast to
the Commission, it is not therefore proposed to give Canadian
shareholders of these corporations full credit at the personal
level for corporate income tax paid. Instead Canadian share-
20 White Paper, para. 3.3.
21 White Paper, para. 3.34.
22 White Paper, paras. 1.40, 4.19, 4.32.
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holders would receive credit for half the corporate tax paid on
cash or stock dividends to replace the existing 20% dividend tax
credit as a more equitable incentive to Canadian ownership of
Canadian industry.2 3
The benefits of half inclusion for capital gains on
widely-held shares are therefore roughly balanced by the half
credit for corporate tax paid. Further compensation is provided
by the pioneering proposal to tax the accrued gains on shares of
widely-held corporations every five years. By contrast, signifi-
cant tax postponement would be possible on most other capital
gains, as there would be no deemed realization but rather a
carry-over of cost basis at death. Like the Carter approach, the
government's proposals in this area represent a carefully
integrated package. Indeed if we could assume that the tax on
widely-held corporations is one-third shifted to consumers
whilst that on closely-held corporations is not subject to
shifting, quite a strong case could be made for the White Paper
modifications of the Carter proposals even by the exacting
standards of the Carter Commission. 
2 4
Another area in which the government had already
departed sharply from the Commission's concept of the
comprehensive tax base is in the treatment of bequests and gifts.
The proposal to tax these items as ordinary income was
completely rejected at an early stage in the government's
deliberations. The Commission's rather shaky argument that
interspousal transfers should be completely exempt from tax
was, however, accepted and embodied in a far-reaching reform
of the estate and gift taxes early in 1969.
Other proposals to tax a variety of items previously
excluded from the income base are more consistent with the
Commission's approach. Examples would include the more
stringent treatment of expense account benefits, taxation of
unemployment insurance benefits (with a deduction for
employee contributions), accrual taxation for the professions
and the broadening of the business income tax base to provide
more adequate taxation of cooperatives, credit unions, trusts,
23 White Paper, paras. 4.34 - 4.36.
24 For details, see my paper "An Economic Appraisal of the Capital
Gains Proposals", Report of Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Tax
Conference, Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970, p. 95.
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and (to a lesser degree) the extractive industries. Measures to
tax the life insurance industry had already been introduced on
the basis of the Commission's recommendations in 1969.
Proposals for a more rational system of deductions for medical
expenses, new deductions for employment expenses and moving
expenses, and a general averaging scheme to reduce discrimina-
tion against those with fluctuating incomes were also inspired
by the Carter recommendations, though the averaging scheme is
much less generous.
Even though they are generally less far-reaching than the
Carter proposals, the many changes in the income tax base
which we have so far discussed would cumulatively represent a
substantial movement towards equal treatment of people in
similar economic circumstances, the Carter objective of hori-
zontal equity. The taxation of capital gains would also greatly
increase the effective progressiveness of the system by
increasing the burden on high-income taxpayers. Like the
Commission, however, the government would simultaneously
reduce the top rate of the personal income tax to about 50% to
minimize disincentive effects on effort, saving and investment
and (in combination with a corporate tax rate of 50%) to close
off the possibility of tax avoidance through retained earnings.
In spite of this modification the tax system would still be
substantially more progressive at the upper end of the income
scale.
At the bottom of the income scale the White Paper
proposals go somewhat beyond those of the Carter Commission,
which would have left the existing tax-exemption level
essentially unchanged. By contrast, under the White Paper the
personal exemption for a single taxpayer would rise from
$1,000 to $1,400 and f6r a married taxpayer from $2,000 to
$2,800. This would free some 750,000 current taxpayers from
income tax liability and would reduce the burden on 3,000,000
other low-income taxpayers. (The benefits that would otherwise
accrue at higher income levels would be offset by higher tax
rates.)
Along with the comprehensive tax base and the principle
of greater effective progression the Commission had also
strongly advocated the adoption of the family (and single
individual) as the tax unit. This proposal was in effect shelved
for the present in the White Paper, although the new and very
Evolution of the Canadian Tax Reform 65
liberal deduction recommended for child-care expenses depends
very heavily for its equity rationale on the family unit concept.
Whilst the primary emphasis in the White Paper proposals,
as in the Carter Report, is on equity, other public policy
objectives are not forgotten. Like the Commission the
government expects favourable effects on private sector
resource allocation to result from the removal of many
discriminatory provisions in the existing law. Thus, for example,
the taxation of capital gains and the integration proposals,
combined with more consistent treatment of different types of
business, should substantially reduce an array of existing
non-neutralities variously affecting different firms and in-
dustries and distorting debt-equity ratios and pay-out policies.
The need for certain specific departures from strict
neutrality is also recognised to encourage risky ventures. There
are, however, some interesting differences in the relevant
proposals from those of the Commission. Thus, for example, no
general incentive for small business is proposed. In contrast to
the Commission, the government interprets the existing low
21% rate on the first $35,000 of corporate income (combined
with the 20% dividend tax credit) as a very inefficient attempt
to eliminate the competitive disadvantage suffered by small
corporations relative to unincorporated businesses which pay no
corporate tax. 2 ' The White Paper proposal for full integration
of the personal and corporate taxes and full taxation of capital
gains for the shareholders of closely-held corporations is
therefore precisely designed to put small corporations in the
same tax position as their unincorporated competitors, without
the loopholes and distortions associated with the low 21% rate.
This line of argument would suggest that no special incentive to
small business is required, and none is recommended.
The White Paper approach to the mining and petroleum
industries also differs significantly from that of the Commis-
sion, which would have limited the long-run concession to an
immediate write-off for exploration expenses. In response to
fierce opposition from the industries and the major provinces
involved, it is conceded in the White Paper that substantial
concessions are still required in recognition of the extra risks
25 White Paper, paras. 4.9 - 4.11.
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involved and the industries' contribution to regional develop-
ment. The existing incentives are, however, excessively generous
and inefficient and would be replaced by concessions more
directly related to exploration and development activity. Thus
the percentage depletion allowances would be transformed into
a "tax subsidy" on exploration and development. For every $3
of exploration and development outlays the taxpayer would
earn the right to $1 of depletion allowance up to the previous
maximum of one-third of production profits. The three-year
exemption for new mines would likewise be replaced by an
accelerated write-off for mining machinery and buildings. The
immediate write-off for exploration and development expenses
would be continued.
A somewhat reduced concern for neutrality is also to be
observed in the proposals for taxing international income. The
existing differences between the tax treatment of foreign-source
income derived from the operations of a branch, a subsidiary or
portfolio investment would by and large continue. The changes
proposed had the more limited aims of reducing tax avoidance
through the use of controlled foreign corporations in tax haven
jurisdictions and of strengthening the hand of the Canadian
government in negotiating a much-needed extension of the
existing network of tax treaties.
On the sensitive issue of economic growth the government
argues that the proposed reforms should have no significantly
unfavourable effects. The main effects anticipated include a
moderate reduction in aggregate private saving of some $525m.
(or somewhat less than 4%), due mainly to an expected increase
of about $560m. in corporate tax revenue by the fifth year of
the new system. Some reduction in capital spending, especially
by closely-held corporations and the extractive industries, is
also expected. The net effect on private saving and capital
formation is, however, impossible to estimate in the absence of
any indication in the White Paper as to how the government
would plan to use the substantial increase in revenues expected.
Assuming that some part of the increased revenue would be
used to finance public capital outlays or to reduce tax rates, the
net unfavourable effect could be reduced to minimal propor-
tions. The White Paper nevertheless remains much less
reassuring on growth effects than the Carter Report.
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On the whole the White Paper proposals go a very long
way towards meeting the challenge of Carter. In spite of fierce
opposition in the Carter debate, equity remains the foundation
of a far-reaching programme of reform which would reduce or
eliminate a multitude of loopholes and discriminatory provi-
sions in the income tax system.
Stage III - The White Paper Process
When the White Paper was presented it was announced that the
government would welcome public discussion of the proposals.
Detailed legislation would be introduced only after parliament,
the public and the provinces had been given full opportunity to
comment on the changes proposed, and possible modifications
would be considered in the light of the views expressed. At the
parliamentary level the White Paper was referred to the
Commons Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs
and to the Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce. Both committees held extensive public hearings and
received hundreds of briefs and other submissions. Their
reports, and particularly that of the Commons Committee, had
a very considerable influence on the final legislation. The
government held numerous discussions with the provinces
which were also of crucial importance in shaping the final
proposals. Finally there was a vigorous public debate led by the
Conservative opposition and representatives of the business
community.
As we have seen, the White Paper proposals retain much of
the strong equity thrust of the Carter Report. It is not therefore
surprising that the public reaction was once again extremely
hostile. It had perhaps been hoped that the various concessions
which had already been made would serve to produce that
"consensus of informed Canadians" which had escaped the
Carter Commission. It was found, however, that those who
stood to pay more as a result of particular proposals remained
unshakeably opposed, and the discussion was dominated once
again by representatives of the business community and other
more affluent sections of the population.
In some respects the White Paper was in fact more
vulnerable to criticism than the Carter Report. This is true, for
example, of the large long-run revenue increase estimated at
$630m. (based on 1969 incomes) by the fifth year of the new
68 The Dalhousie Law Journal
system. As a result the rates of tax proposed were significantly
higher than under the existing system, especially in the
middle-income ranges. These rates would be necessary to ensure
that there would be no reduction in revenue in the first year of
the new system, but could be reduced as various transitional
concessions expire and revenue begins to build up. Completely
unnecessary opposition was therefore created by the failure to
provide explicitly for future tax reductions. As we have already
seen, this expected revenue increase is also the source of much
uncertainty regarding the growth effects of the proposed
changes, and it contributed greatly to the success of the
business community in presenting the White Paper as a recipe
for economic stagnation. As a result, the Minister finally
announced in June, 1970 that the final legislation would
include a schedule of rate reductions to absorb the expected
revenue increase.
As in the case of the Carter Report the most important
proposals in the White Paper from the point of view of equity
are those relating to capital gains. As we have seen, the White
Paper proposals in this area constitute a carefully integrated and
reasonably equitable package, but the individual components of
the package appear to involve strikingly inconsistent treatment
of capital gains on different types of assets. As a result the
proposals were particularly vulnerable to criticism.
Thus, for example, there was very strong criticism of the
differential treatment proposed for gains on closely-held and
widely-held shares. If, for various reasons, half inclusion is
appropriate for widely-held share gains, it is surely impossible to
justify full inclusion for closely-held share gains or, for that
matter, personal property gains. This superficially plausible
argument was accepted by both parliamentary committees, even
though it completely overlooks offsetting provisions in the
reform package as a whole and even within the capital gains
area. The compensating proposal to tax the accrued gains on
widely-held shares every five years fared even less well and was
almost unanimously condemned as inequitable and econom-
ically dangerous.' 6
26 For a recent discussion of the many advantages of an accrual tax,
see C. S. Shoup, "The White Paper: Accrual Accounting for Capital Gains
and Losses", Canadian Tax Journal, Vol. XV111, No. 2, 1970.
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The related corporate tax provisions were also fiercely
criticized as discriminatory and inconsistent. It was argued that
half integration for widely-held corporations and full integra-
tion for closely-held corporations would inevitably create
serious competitive distortions. The Ford Company of Canada
(widely-held) and General Motors of Canada (closely-held) was
one widely-quoted example. It was claimed, with some
justification, that no conceivable redefinition of the basic White
Paper categories could avoid creating numerous problems of this
sort. As in the Carter debate there was in fact strong opposition
to any form of integration, partly because of the associated
implications for capital gains taxation and partly because the
integration credit would not apply to tax-sheltered or foreign-
source income where no Canadian corporate tax had been paid.
Another major weakness in the corporate tax proposals
was the absence of any concession to small business to
compensate for the withdrawal of the low 21% rate on the first
$35,000 of corporate profits. As recognised by the Commission,
some compensating tax incentive is justified as an offset to
capital market bias against small, new fast-growing firms. The
failure to provide some such concession produced a storm of
opposition much of which might well have been avoided. As a
result the Minister soon conceded that some incentive should be
provided, and a special departmental committee was established
to look into the problem.
As the Carter debate clearly showed, it would, however, be
very misleading to attribute the hostile reaction to the White
Paper solely or even mainly to these flaws and apparent incon-
sistencies in some of the major proposals. The Carter Report
was a model of consistency, but was bitterly attacked. In both
cases the fundamental problem lies in the essentially redistribu-
tive character of the proposals. Like the Carter Report, the
White Paper provisions would impose obvious and substantial
new burdens on a relatively small but affluent, articulate and
well organised section of the community which could hardly be
expected to stand idly by. The futility, from this point of view,
of the various compromise provisions embodied in the White
Paper is well illustrated by the strong opposition of the mining
and petroleum interests to the new incentive scheme proposed
for these industries.
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As in the case of the Carter reforms, the benefits from the
White Paper proposals would be widely dispersed over the
relatively unorganised mass of taxpayers at the bottom of the
income scale. The substantial increase proposed in the personal
exemptions should no doubt be interpreted as an attempt to
make these benefits more dramatically obvious and politically
more effective. This and other concessions at the lower income
levels were not, however, clearly linked in the public mind with
the important reforms proposed further up the income scale. As
a result the considerable popular support for the exemption
increase (and the new deductions for employment expenses and
child care expenses) did not carry over into articulate popular
support for other aspects of the programme.
If the White Paper experiment in participatory democracy
was not to be exposed as a sham or a failure some further
concessions to the opposition were therefore unavoidable.
Reports of the Parliamentary Committees
The reports of the parliamentary committees were presented in
the fall of 1970 and reflect in varying degrees the over-
whelmingly hostile reaction of representatives of the business
and professional organisations from whom the bulk of the briefs
and other submissions were received.
The Commons Committee would retain most of the White
Paper proposals, though with some significant modifications.2'7
The most important change proposed is in the crucial area of
capital gains and corporate income where the Committee
recommends a uniform system of half inclusion in personal
income for all realised capital gains and half integration for all
corporations whether closely-held or widely-held. An exception
would, however, be made for the first $50,000 of corporate
income of closely-held corporations where full integration
would be allowed. In place of the quinquennial tax on accrued
capital gains, the Simons-Carter system of a deemed realization
of accrued gains at death and on gifts is proposed in order to
limit tax postponement and lock-in effects. Some reduction in
27 Eighteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs Respecting the White Paper on Tax Reform,
Ottawa, October 1970.
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estate taxes would at the same time be made to limit the double
impact of capital gains and estate tax at death, which had been
fiercely criticized as discussions turned to this alternative. 28
The top rate of the personal income tax would, however, be
reduced to 60% rather than 50% as in the White Paper.
Other important changes proposed include a significant
liberalisation of the new incentive scheme for the mining and
petroleum industries. In particular the categories of expenditure
which would be eligible for the new accelerated write-off and
earned depletion provisions would be considerably broadened.
These changes would supplement a number of concessions
already announced by the Minister in August, 1970.
The need for an adequate incentive for small business is
also strongly stressed, but it is agreed that the existing dual rate
system has created serious problems and should be abolished.
Some broad principles but no detailed proposals are offered
regarding the form of the new incentive.
The Committee concludes that these changes should
remove any cause for concern that the White Paper proposals
would adversely affect Canada's rate of growth. At the same
time it is noted rather revealingly that ". . .a number of the
Committee's suggestions for modifying White Paper proposals
stem not from a belief that those proposals are inequitable or
detrimental to economic growth, but from a concern for
taxpayer understanding and acceptance. "29
The Senate Committee was much more impressed by the
arguments put forward by the business community and would
either reject or entirely revamp the major White Paper
proposals. 30 On capital gains the Committee recommends a
variant of the U.S. system with the troublesome U.S. distinction
between short-term and long-term gains and a rate of tax on
long-term gains limited to 25% or half the marginal income tax
rate of the taxpayer, whichever is less. Instead of a deemed
realization at death or on gift, a carry-over of cost basis is
proposed which would allow unlimited tax postponement. This
effect would be further increased by an extended system of
28 Ibid., pp. 33-4.
29 Ibid., p. 11.
30 Report on the White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform Presented to
the Senate of Canada, Ottawa, September 1970.
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roll-over provisions. Although the deemed realization at death is
rejected, the Committee still felt able to suggest that the
government ". .might well consider abandoning the estate tax
field to the provinces. ..",1 The top rate of the personal
income tax would moreover be reduced to 50% as proposed in
the White Paper.
The White Paper integration proposals are also completely
rejected, and the existing system of corporate income taxation
would be retained with relatively minor modifications. In a
rather unsatisfactory attempt to meet the White Paper objection
that the 20% dividend tax credit favours high-income share-
holders, the credit would be graduated in three broad steps to
provide a higher percentage credit to shareholder with a smaller
volume of dividends.
Similarly in the case of the incentives to the mining and
petroleum industries the Committee recommends in effect that
the existing system of incentives be retained with only minor
adjustments. The three-year 100% exemption for new mines
would be reduced to 75%, but supplemented by the accelerated
write-off proposed in the White Paper. The 33 1/3% depletion
allowances would similarly be reduced to a minimum of 20%,
but supplemented by a liberalised version of the government's
earned depletion provisions.
The Committee would also retain the low 21% rate on the
first $35,000 of corporate income as an incentive to small
business. In an attempt to meet some of the major criticisms,
use of the low rate would, however, be restricted to the business
income of private corporations with net profits not exceeding
$100,000.
The White Paper proposals for the treatment of interna-
tional income, entertainment expenses and a variety of other
items are either completely rejected or would be substantially
watered down. Reflecting the general tenor of the public
debate, only the new deductions and concessions are really
welcomed. Even here a significant change is proposed which
would replace the politically very popular exemption increase
by a form of vanishing exemption thus avoiding the need for
rate increases to offset the benefits further up the income scale.
31 Ibid., p. 4 5.
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Provincial Reaction
Provincial support for the proposals was also essential in order
to preserve the considerable economic, administrative and
compliance advantages of the system under which the provincial
governments 3 2 levy personal and corporate income tax on the
same base as the federal government which collects the tax on
their behalf. Provincial reaction to the major provisions for
capital gains and corporate taxation and to the proposed
changes in the incentives for the mineral industries and small
business was, however, extremely unfavourable. As a result
there was a strong possibility that a number of provinces would
refuse to harmonize with the federal system if the White Paper
proposals were implemented. It is not therefore surprising that,
both in general and on particular points of detail, provincial
attitudes exercised a crucial influence on the shape of the final
legislation.
The differences between the federal and provincial
positions are clearly illustrated in the critique of the White
Paper and the set of counter-proposals published by the Ontario
government in June 1970." On capital gains the Ontario
government would favour a completely separate tax at a flat
rate of 25% with a distinction between short-term and
long-term gains and a deemed realization at death or upon
emigration. Like the Senate Committee, they recommend a
simultaneous and "drastic" reduction in death and gift taxes.
The top rate of the personal income tax would, however, be "at
least" 65%.
In the corporate tax field the existing system would be
retained though with a graduated dividend tax credit along the
lines subsequently recommended by the Senate Committee. The
proposals for the mineral industries also foreshadow the Senate
recommendations, and a substantial incentive for small business
is strongly advocated.
Other significant differences from the White Paper include
the proposal for a low income allowance to replace the
exemption increase, and a tax credit for working mothers to
replace the proposed deduction for child care expenses. On the
32 Except Quebec and, in the case of the corporate tax, Ontario.
33 Ontario Proposals for Tax Reform in Canada, Toronto, 1970.
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basis of a detailed computer study it is also suggested that the
White Paper estimate of the expected long-run revenue increase
is much too low; and the need to provide explicitly for
compensating rate reductions is particularly stressed.
The Final Legislation
In the light of public reaction, the reports of the parliamentary
committees and the views of the provinces, the White Paper
proposals were substantially revised, and the government finally
presented its detailed proposals in Bill C-259 on June 18,
1971.1 4 A large number of relatively minor and mostly
technical amendments were subsequently approved in the fall,
and the legislation was eventually passed just in time to take
effect in 1972.
Since the opposition to the White Paper had focussed on
the tax increases proposed, including those for middle-income
wage and salary earners to finance the increased personal
exemptions, the government finally had resort to the classic tax
reform strategy of combining the reforms with a tax cut. The
method chosen was to remove the 3% surtaxes on personal and
corporate income which had been imposed as an anti-inflation-
ary measure in 1968. As a result it was possible to ensure that
taxes would either be reduced or substantially unchanged on
wage and salary incomes. Rate reductions were also scheduled
for the following four years to absorb the expected revenue
increase which had been such a controversial and confusing
issue in the White Paper debate.
On capital gains the new legislation closely follows the
recommendations of the Commons Committee for a general
system of half inclusion of realized capital gains in personal
income with a deduction for one-half of capital losses. The
system applies to all capital assets with very limited exceptions
such as (1) complete exemption for a principal residence (plus
up to one acre of surrounding land), (2) an exemption for
personal property where sale proceeds do not exceed $1,000.
Losses are generally deductible first against gains and then, up
to a limited amount of $1,000 against other income. Any excess
34 For a general description of the proposals, see Summary of 1971
Tax Reform Legislation.
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can be carried back one year and forward indefinitely. Losses
are not, however, deductible in the case of personal property
which depreciates through use, and in other cases losses are
deductible only from gains on other personal property with a
limited one-year carry-back and five-year carry-forward. Similar
provisions apply to corporate as to individual capital gains,
except that there is no deduction for losses against other
income. As recommended by the Carter Commission and the
Commons Committee, there is a deemed realization of accrued
gains on assets transferred by bequest or gift with an exemption
for inter-spousal transfers. This latter provision is, however, at
least partly offset by the extraordinary decision to abolish the
recently reformed federal estate and gift tax as suggested by the
Senate Committee. The top rate of the personal income tax is
also reduced, but only to 61% as recommended by the
Commons Committee.
From the point of view of equity the new system of
capital gains taxation undoubtedly represents a significant
retreat from the more far-reaching proposals of the Carter
Commission and the White Paper. The degree of preferential
treatment is, however, greatly reduced and the tax is perhaps
the most equitable to be found in any advanced country. To be
set against this achievement is the fact that the government
chose to pay a disastrously heavy price for the deemed
realization at death, going far beyond the recommendations of
the Commons Committee to the complete repeal of the federal
estate and gift tax. As a result the plugging of the death
loophole in the tax on realized capital gains has been made the
occasion for the abandonment to interprovincial competition of
another tax with an equally important but quite different
equity rationale.
Compromise is evident once again in the new corporate tax
provisions. Abstracting for the moment from the special
treatment of private corporations, the new legislation provides
for what amounts in effect to approximately a 33 1/3% gross-up
and credit on dividends. Like the dividend tax credit which it
replaces, the new gross-up and credit is available regardless of
whether Canadian corporate tax has been paid. Like the half
integration proposal of the White Paper and the Commons
Committee, and in contrast to the dividend tax credit, the new
credit would, however, reduce "double taxation" by about the
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same proportion for shareholders in all income brackets (except
those below 25%, since no refund will be paid where the credit
exceeds personal income tax liability).
This compromise provision thus successfully achieves the
government's objective of eliminating a possible inequity in the
dividend tax credit, whilst satisfying those who were alarmed
that the credit might be withdrawn for tax-sheltered or
foreign-source income. The scrapping of the integration
proposals and the resulting lack of coordination between the
new credit and the capital gains provisions ensures, however,
that the important objective of reducing discrimination against
dividends and in favour of retained earnings is much less fully
achieved. As a result, a variety of inequities and associated
tax-induced distortions of corporate pay-out policies, debt-
equity ratios and the allocation of capital between different
firms and industries will remain. These effects are further
reinforced by the reduced concessions at the top of the income
scale.
For small business the low rate of corporate tax is to
continue but in an ingeniously modified and restricted form
which will effectively limit the benefits to small private
Canadian-controlled corporations which actually use the re-
sulting tax savings for direct business purposes. Under the new
scheme, a Canadian-controlled private corporation pays a
concessional 25% rate on the first $50,000 of business income
each year until it has accumulated a total income of $400,000.
As recommended by the Senate Committee, investment income
is excluded from the concession, and special provisions have
been introduced to ensure approximately full integration with
the personal income tax for the investment income of private
corporations, thus eliminating the intractable tax avoidance
problem of the "incorporated pocketbook". Full integration is
also provided in effect for dividends paid out of business
income which has been taxed at the low rate. Combined with a
provision which excludes income paid out in dividends from
accumulated taxable income in determining eligibility for the
low rate, this ensures that small static corporations which
distribute most of their income are effectively placed in the
same tax position as an unincorporated business. A true
concession is therefore involved only where the tax savings
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resulting from the low rate are used for purposes of business
expansion.
The new small business incentive is likely to be con-
siderably more efficient per dollar of revenue cost than the
system it replaces. Combined with the new tax on capital gains,
the scope for tax avoidance through the small corporation is
also greatly reduced. Unfortunately the remaining imperfections
are sufficiently serious to require the continuation of some of
the arbitrary anti-avoidance provisions of the previous law.
These problems could have been completely solved only by the
Carter and White Paper proposals for full integration and full
taxation of capital gains for private corporations. It is also most
unfortunate that no way was found to extend a corresponding
tax incentive to small unincorporated businesses.
In contrast to the major provisions so far discussed, the
new system of tax incentives for the mining and petroleum
industries follows, in form at least, the general approach laid
down in the White Paper, though with some further liberalisa-
tion along the lines suggested by the Commons Committee. The
most significant changes include the extension of the new
system of accelerated depreciation for mining machinery and
buildings to a variety of associated outlays on roads, railways,
refineries, townsites, airports and docks. A similar but more
restricted allowance will also apply in the case of a major
expansion of an existing mine. The definition of exploration
and development outlays for purposes of the new earned
depletion provisions is likewise extended to include all the
above items with the exception of social capital outlays such as
townsites. Also included is the significant reduction, previously
announced, in the rate of tax on mining profits from 40% to
25% in order to make additional tax room available to the
provinces.
Although the form of the White Paper proposals has thus
been preserved in the new legislation, most of the substance has
unfortunately disappeared. The new concessions which have
been granted ensure that the degree of preferential treatment of
these industries has been little if at all reduced. Generous
transitional provisions along the lines of the White Paper further
ensure that it will be many years before even these limited
effects are felt.
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A variety of other less important changes in exemptions,
inclusions, deductions and other adjustments in the tax base
closely follow the White Paper proposals. Amongst the
politically more popular proposals, the new legislation goes
somewhat beyond the White Paper and raises the personal
exemptions to $1,500 for a single taxpayer and $2,850 for a
married taxpayer. At the lower end of the income scale the
government therefore recognises in effect those economies of
living together which had led it to condemn the Carter
proposals for a family unit as a "tax on marriage"." The new
deductions for employment and moving expenses and for child
care expenses are virtually the same as the corresponding White
Paper proposals, and this is also true of the new system for
taxing unemployment insurance, fellowships, research grants
and training allowances. The new general averaging scheme
involves a somewhat more liberal application of the White Paper
proposal for backwards averaging and moves on towards Carter
with a useful forward averaging provision for a variety of
"unusual receipts".
Other relatively minor changes involve some watering-
down of the White Paper scheme. This is especially true where
strong opposition was encountered, as, for example, in the case
of expense account benefits and the income of cooperatives,
credit unions and the professions. The degree of preferential
treatment is, however, generally reduced, and significant
loopholes in the tax treatment of rental buildings and the
income of controlled foreign corporations have been closed in
spite of strong opposition. An actual reduction in equity is to
be observed only in the increased deductions for retirement
savings and for charitable contributions which were evidently
added in a further attempt to sweeten the package and, in the
case of retirement savings, to help counter the argument that
the reforms will reduce savings and growth.
Although falling far short of the equity ideals of the Carter
Report, and even of the White Paper, the cumulative effect of
all these changes is undoubtedly to create a somewhat more
equitable tax system. The considerable broadening of the tax
base, and, in particular, the taxation of capital gains, will
35 White Paper, para. 2.5.
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significantly reduce tax discrimination between people in
substantially similar economic circumstances. At the bottom of
the income scale the increased exemptions provide useful relief.
The new system of capital gains taxation will also help to ensure
that effective rates of tax rise smoothly at higher income levels
instead of flattening out behind a facade of ostentatiously
progressive nominal rates. These effects are admittedly offset to
some degree by the disastrous decision to abolish the federal
estate tax. Taking all the various changes together, there
nevertheless seems little doubt that a modest overall gain in tax
equity has been achieved.
Another major objective of the Carter and White Paper
proposals was to improve private sector resources allocation by
reducing or eliminating a variety of discriminatory or non-
neutral provisions in the tax system. Here again some small
gains can be claimed, though an extremely complicated array of
non-neutralities remains. The attempt to reform the incentives
to the extractive industries failed almost completely, and the
new incentive to small business is in some respects disappointing
and adds greatly to the complexity of the system.
In the light of these relatively limited achivements in the
areas of equity and efficiency, it might perhaps be expected
that the growth effects should be significantly more favourable.
As the Carter Commission had emphasized, however, an
equitable system of taxation is not necessarily growth-
inhibiting, and the less vigorous equity thrust of the new
legislation does not automatically guarantee that it will have
more favourable growth effects. The abolition of the estate tax,
for example, is extremely costly from the point of view of
equity, but provides only a very weak and indirect incentive to
saving and capital formation to offset the effects of taxing
capital gains. On balance the most that can be said is that the
new system should not much affect the rate of economic
growth.
Finally it should be noted that the modest equity and
neutrality achievements of the new legislation are already
threatened with substantial further erosion as a result of the
corporate tax changes announced in the pre-election budget of
May, 1972. Although ostensibly designed to offset the effects
of recent U.S. export incentives and in particular the so-called
DISC legislation, the proposed changes are excessively generous
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and must be interpreted in part as a final concession to the
views of the business community.
3 6
Conclusion
In retrospect the evolution of the Canadian tax reform debate is
not difficult to understand. Starting with the Royal Commis-
sion, the attractions of the modern theory of tax reform based
on the twin objectives of equity and neutrality are considerable
and have been cogently argued in the public finance literature
for over thirty years. The fundamental political weaknesses of
this approach have, however, been largely ignored. It would
have been a remarkable coincidence indeed if the government in
power had happened to share the detailed equity conceptions of
the Carter Report and also had the courage to implement the
necessary legislation in the face of powerful opposition by those
who stood to pay.
The Carter emphasis on equity and neutrality nevertheless
set the stage for the subsequent debate. The White Paper
accordingly offered a set of compromise proposals involving
dilution of the major Carter recommendations but still
representing a carefully integrated package of reforms with a
strong equity thrust. With the laudable aim of involving
parliament, the public and the provinces in the making of major
36. Some further if relatively minor concessions are contained in the
budget of February, 1973, notably in relation to the small business
incentive and the deemed realization of capital gains at death (in the case
of a farm passing to the children).
Somewhat wider questions are raised by the interesting new budget
proposal to index the rate brackets and exemptions for the personal
income tax to eliminate the effects of inflation. This would tend to reduce
the built-in stabilizing effects of the tax system and also the volume of
public expenditure. Some improvement in equity could also be expected,
for example, between people with very different time patterns of income.
It was only very late in the tax reform debate that the possibility of an
inflation adjustment began to be seriously discussed with particular
reference to capital gains. See especially J. Helliwell, "The Taxation of
Capital Gains", Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. II, No. 2, 1969. It
should be noted that the general inflation adjustment proposed in the
1973 budget would involve no special concession for capital gains, and
rightly so as they already enjoy the special benefits of half inclusion under
the new legislation.
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tax reform, the White Paper process of participatory democracy
then gave the various interest groups a final opportunity to
defend their tax privileges. Because of widespread ignorance and
organisational difficulties there was no countervailing campaign
on behalf of the lower income groups who stood to gain.
Further compromise was therefore inevitable, bringing with it
additional complications and inconsistencies. In the final result,
with the help of some seriously misguided and excessively
generous concessions, notably in the death tax area and the
extractive industries (and subsequently in the 1972 budget), the
original equity and neutrality emphasis of the ten-year tax
reform process was largely lost.
In view of the very limited results achieved from the
enormous outlay of money, time and effort, it is tempting to
ask whether much the same results could not have been
achieved more economically in some other way. The capital
gains tax stands out as the major achievement of the ten-year
reform process; but a similar tax had been introduced (without
death tax concessions) in the United Kingdom shortly after the
Labour Party came to power in 1964, while the Carter
Commission was still engrossed in its work. Such a major change
requires, however, either broad popular support or strong
ideological commitment on the part of the government. In the
Canadian context both prerequisites were lacking, and it was
only as a result of the radically new perspective provided by the
Carter Report that general capital gains taxation came finally to
be viewed as desirable or at least inevitable. Most of the other
changes were admittedly less controversial or even positively
popular (like the exemption increase) and could have been
legislated at any time without the need for a far-reaching
inquiry or prolonged public debate.
